Conceptual Framework

A new national security vision for Israel's 75th Year

Background

1. This document is the keystone and the initial product within a series that puts forth a new vision for the State of Israel's national security toward the seventy-fifth year of its existence and calls for a revolution in the current conception.

2. The document details: The need for change, the opportunity that stands before Israel, the vision required for Israel's national security and principles of action proposed for its fulfillment.

3. The publication of this document marks the beginning of an undertaking that is aimed at generating a professional and public dialogue on these issues.

Introduction

4. "Israel's national security concept" refers to a system of values and principles that have shaped Israel's national security institutions. It also refers to the manner in which the state has exercised its strength and capabilities in the fields of security and foreign affairs in order to protect its existence and security.

5. This concept was designed under the leadership of David Ben Gurion in the early years of the state, and has been modified over the years in light of various developments in Israel's political and security environment, though it was never formalized in official government decisions.

Foundations of Israel’s National Security Concept

6. The State of Israel is a Jewish state, exercising the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. Beyond its commitment to its residents, since its inception Israel has seen itself as a safe haven for Diaspora Jewry. In this spirit, the state expects the political and financial support of world Jewry.
7. **A Jewish majority** is a necessary condition for the existence of Israel as a Jewish state that is also a democratic state.

8. **An alliance with a superpower such as the United States** is essential in order for Israel to compensate for its quantitative inferiority in comparison with its enemies and to be able to influence events in the Middle East. In this context, Israel chose to be a part of the community of Western states, and became their ‘frontline’ against the Arab states that were supported by the 'Eastern Bloc.'

9. **An array of strategic alliances in the Middle East and its periphery** (the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkans) enable Israel to divide the forces standing before it and to prevent a situation in which it is confronted by an overwhelming coalition.

10. **Basic legitimacy for Israel's existence and its borders** – The Zionist movement and the State of Israel strive for the official recognition of Israel's right to exist as the nation state of the Jewish people as well as for official recognition of its borders. This legitimacy is consolidated in international decisions and agreements achieved through diplomatic maneuvers and with the help of the Jewish diaspora.

11. **The Middle East is governed by realpolitik dynamics taking place between the leaders of countries** – The Middle East is shaped by interactions between leaders of countries who usually make decision in a rational manner.

12. **The exclusive responsibility for national security rests in the hands of the state’s institutions**, which alone possess the information and ability to design the country’s security strategy and to execute it.

13. **The "Iron Wall Doctrine"** aims to frustrate the aspiration of Arab countries to bring about the physical destruction of Israel. It is based on the development of decisive military superiority, rooted in several principles:
   - Deterring through the ability to quickly achieve decisive victory on the battlefield;
   - Shortening the length of military confrontations and extending the duration of ceasefires between rounds of violence;
   - Transferring the fighting to the enemies' territory and separating between the battleground and the home front;
   - Developing qualitative superiority through technology and human resources;
   - Achieving advance warning using a comprehensive intelligence collection system designed to enable Israel to prepare and to take preventative action if required;
'People's Army model' / infantry-reserve system as the response to the quantitative gap faced by Israel in comparison to Arab armies. The relatively small standing army is responsible for ongoing security and first response in emergency situations, while a comprehensive and rapidly mobilized reserve system is expected to win the war;

Developing strategic capabilities for doomsday scenarios.

In conclusion, the Iron Wall doctrine assumes that it is impossible to affect hostility towards Israel in the region, and it therefore only aims to frustrate hostile actions. The concept leads to constant military activity, both on an under the radar, aimed at preserving the status quo within regional power relations.

14. **The IDF is a contractor for national missions and acts as a melting pot** – In light of the massive resources allocated to the IDF, the IDF was given additional responsibility for civil ‘national missions’ such as immigrant absorption, settlement, education, and policing.

15. **The centrality of security** – The national security challenges facing Israel are unique in scope and quality, and require a full harnessing of national resources. Since the main threat to Israel is military, the IDF has become the central institution of the national security community and in the Israeli public sphere, and receives preference in the allocation of human resources, budget, and time.

**Key Elements of the Security Conception Undermined**

Central components of this security concept are being undermined in recent years (see table):

16. **The Jewish people and Israel are drifting apart** – A growing number of Jews do not see Israel as a central component of their identity, they do not support it, and are not involved in it. Some are critical or hostile to Israel. At the same time, Jewish communal institutions are weakening, and therefore the ability of Diaspora Jews to support Israel and connect to it as an organized community is eroding.

17. **Continued control over the Palestinian population undermines the balance between Israel's democratic identity and its Jewish character.**

18. **The United States is no longer Israel's 'stable rock'** – The United States is in a continuing crisis of governance manifested primarily in its economic situation and international status. Moreover, the rise of China and Russia, the United States' experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its energy independence shift its attention from the Middle East.
19. **Fundamental delegitimization of Israel in the Middle East is led by a network of non-governmental organizations** – For the past decade, Israel has stood against a systemic and systematic attack on its political model, which aims to deny its fundamental legitimacy as the nation state of the Jewish people. This campaign is taking place in the Arab and Muslim world and through a network of organizations and activists worldwide.

20. **Israel's central alliances in the Middle East are in a state of upheaval and are weakened as channels of influence** – The regimes in Egypt and Jordan have weakened relative to rising civil societies there, and they are faced with significant internal challenges. As a result, the ability of the leadership of these countries to exert influence has diminished. Turkey scaled back its ties with Israel and in practice dismantled the strategic alliance between the two countries.

21. **The 'Arab Spring' has ushered in chaos and the collapse of state 'addresses' in the Middle East** – Major countries in the Middle East have broken down into players and sub-state units with unique religious, geographical, cultural, and national identities. This development obstructs the ability to shape the region through direct contact between leaders by means of rational discourse focused on advancing national interests. In addition, regional upheaval has resulted in a great deal of hesitancy and bewilderment in Israel and in the Western countries. These countries are challenged in crafting and implementing policy aimed at avoiding far-reaching breaches of international law and standing agreements, as well as humanitarian catastrophes.

22. **How it affects Israel:**

   - **On the one hand, religious and secular fundamental hostility against Israel has been renewed in the young generation of the Middle East** – This generation has not experienced the decisive military defeats of the previous decades, but has inherited the perception that Israel is a Western and colonial foreign implant. This situation also exists in Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

   - **On the other hand, Israel is not the primary focus of the region** – Most of the major conflicts in the Middle East are internal Arab or internal Islamic and not related to Israel or its conflict with its neighbors. Moreover, a broad layer within the elites and Arab public is developing that rejects attempts to divert discourse from the failures of Arab society by using Israel as a scapegoat.

23. **Iran is approaching regional hegemony and military nuclear capabilities** – This development could undermine Israel's alleged nuclear exclusivity, and focus the attention of the international community on Israel's capabilities in this arena.
24. **A military response to the IDF’s operating concept has emerged, and conflict is being diverted to additional fields**—Israel's adversaries have developed a response to Israel's military and technological superiority that is succeeding in preventing Israel from attaining swift victories without causing significant damage to personnel or to the home front. Additionally, they have developed combat arenas in which Israel has no advantage. Thus, with the exception of the case of Iran, Israel is facing organizations and movements with no state 'addresses.' Israel experiences difficulty in predicting their actions, and in deterring and defeating them. Therefore:

- Rounds of fighting are becoming longer and occur more frequently;
- Israel's advantage in the combat field is exploited in other fields to damage its legitimacy;
- The cost of military systems is rising with the costs of new technologies;
- Ongoing security needs in routine times are increasing;
- The home front has become the primary arena that is targeted by frequent and sophisticated rocket attacks.

25. **There is increasing complexity and diverse influences operating both at points of conflict and within the overarching system**, resulting in:

- **Difficulty in assigning discrete fields of responsibility and authority** in light of the increasing interconnectivity and interdependence between clearly defined fields;
- **Rising importance of non-military dimensions** in comparison with past conflicts in which military and political dimensions were dominant. These non-military dimensions include, for example, the battle for legitimacy, international law, the economy, home front resilience, and the media. In this evolving reality, a battle could occur in which there is no clear connection between the military achievement and national success;
- **Difficulty in the ability to understand, evaluate, and define scenarios, and to plan and design a campaign.** These difficulties lead to hesitation and reactivity.

26. **Cracks are surfacing in the 'People's Army model'** that was based on the principle of 'the whole nation is the army' and on the division of roles between the

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1 An example can be found in the Second Lebanon War, in which a failure to reach a decisive military victory actually proved a success in strengthening deterrence and quiet in the north. In contrast, Operation Cast Lead saw military successes that were not translated into political or national success.
regular and reserve units, in which the role of the reserve system is to achieve victory in battle.

- **Continuous decline in the compulsory military service ethos** – An increasing proportion of citizens eligible for recruitment do not complete full and significant military service. In addition, the Arab and ultra-Orthodox populations, which do not serve in substantial numbers, represent significantly growing sectors of the population;

- **Unequal burden in reserve duty** – Most able-bodied citizens do not serve a significant reserve duty. The reserve duty related to combat support is negligible, while the burden on those who serve in reserve duty field units is heavy and rigid;

- **Gap between the professional capabilities of the reserves system and the expectation that it constitute the decisive force in battle** – The professional capabilities of the reserves are eroding due to training cuts, the broad utilization of the daily operational employment of the military, and the pace of technological change;

- **The army is generating social gaps** between elite and technological units, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the ‘ordinary’ military infantry units, armored units, artillery corps, etc. and home front commands and units. For the former, service is a springboard for human and social capital. For the latter, service can represent a waste of time for those who serve as well as in the broader national perspective.

27. **Israeli society is increasingly challenging the authority of the representatives of the national security system** – Complex processes in Israeli society and in the world are leading to breaches in the trust that in the past citizens granted to those in national security leadership roles as unquestioned exclusive authorities.

### Table 1: Components of the security strategy against the trends of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of the security strategy</th>
<th>Emerging trend</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The State of Israel is the Jewish state</td>
<td>Growing distance between Israel and the Jewish world</td>
<td>Diaspora support for Israel is not to be taken for granted as it was in the past</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Jewish majority in the State of Israel</td>
<td>Prolonged control of the Palestinian population and increasing difficulty in ending it. Resulting imbalance between Israel's democratic character and Jewishness</td>
<td>Challenge to the internal and external legitimacy of the State of Israel</td>
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<td>Alliance with a superpower</td>
<td>The United States is facing an internal crisis; its dependence on the Middle East decreases, whereas its interest in the Far East increases</td>
<td>U.S. is not a 'stable rock' as in the past. Israel's ability to influence the Middle East through cooperation decreases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel's establishment of alliances in the Middle East and beyond</td>
<td>Egypt and Jordan face internal crisis. Turkey turned a cold shoulder to Israel</td>
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<td>Fundamental legitimacy of Israel's existence within its borders</td>
<td>A civilian campaign to delegitimize Israel</td>
<td>Increasing challenges to Israel's political model (Zionism)</td>
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<td>Rationality / realpolitik in Israel's relations with the Arab world</td>
<td>Chaos in the Middle East; the collapse of 'state addresses'; entry of numerous sub-state actors; religious extremism</td>
<td>Increasing complexity of the arena; lack of political tools to influence</td>
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<td>The state bears exclusive responsibility for national security</td>
<td>Opening of the security discourse and activities to include a wider array of actors outside of the institutional system</td>
<td>Growing criticism of the defense establishment and the government when it acts in the political-security field</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 'Iron Wall' approach to frustrate the Arab objective of destroying Israel is through an activist military that aims at preserving the status quo</td>
<td>On the one hand, Israel has achieved absolute military superiority over its rivals for the foreseeable future and interest in Israel is currently diminished in large segments of the Arab world. On the other hand, hostile energy is renewing itself among</td>
<td>The intensified process of emergence in the region renders constant change the new status quo. The conservative 'Iron Wall' approach has currently for the most part run its course</td>
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<td>religious and secular populations and Iran is striving to acquire a nuclear weapon</td>
<td>Rounds of fighting are longer, more costly, and more frequent than in the past, and do not result in clear Israeli victories</td>
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<td>Deterrence through decisive victories against enemy armies based on a technological advantage</td>
<td>Israel's enemies have developed a combat doctrine that prevents Israel from achieving decisive victories without damaging the home front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existential deterrence by a strategic weapon</td>
<td>Iran strives to be a regional hegemon with nuclear capabilities.</td>
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<td>The security challenge is the main challenge facing the country. The defense establishment is entitled to priority in the allocation of resources</td>
<td>Increase in the centrality of non-military challenges</td>
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<td>Deterrence through decisive victories against enemy armies based on a technological advantage</td>
<td>Declining effectiveness of the Israeli response</td>
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<td>Warning system that enables early preparation</td>
<td>Strategic events that emerge from the bottom-up</td>
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<td>The reserves: &quot;The whole nation is the army.&quot; The reserve system will win the war.</td>
<td>Lack of early warning and ineffective preparation</td>
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<td>The People's Army Model: The IDF has priority in the allocation of national resources, and in return takes on tasks that are not related to national security</td>
<td>The burden of service is not equal. The reserve system is not professional enough to exact decisive outcomes</td>
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<td>The reserves: &quot;The whole nation is the army.&quot; The reserve system will win the war.</td>
<td>Erosion of the social contract surrounding reserve service</td>
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<td>The People's Army Model: The IDF has priority in the allocation of national resources, and in return takes on tasks that are not related to national security</td>
<td>The army generates social gaps</td>
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The Window of Opportunity to Upgrade Israel's National Security

This section of the document introduces the opportunity standing before Israel to leap its national security through a new national security concept that is adapted to a world of radical changes. The opportunity stems from the combination between, on the one hand, the capacity of the Israeli government to govern, make decisions, and implement them, and, on the other hand, emerging political, military, and domestic conditions. Clearly, a change in the national security concept will necessitate resource reallocation, structural and institutional adaptations, and new operational concepts.

The opportunity that stands before Israel in the field of national security stems from a combination between the following conditions:

28. **Intensiﬁying internal crises in all of the countries hostile to Israel** – These crises are dominating the bulk of the attention of the regimes and societies. In particular, a harsh humanitarian crisis that has developed in Syria affects all of the neighboring countries.

29. **Iran and Hezbollah's 'overstretch'** – Both have been submerged into the civil war in Syria. Beyond that, Iran is under significant pressure as a result of the sanctions levied against it, and Hezbollah faces political attacks and terrorist activities in Lebanon.

30. **Palestinian isolation in Gaza and the West Bank** – Hamas is isolated between Israel and Egypt in Gaza, after losing its ally in Syria and Iran. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank stands before Israel alone, without significant support from the Arab League, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, and under pressure from the street to make political progress.

31. **Change in the Israeli public discourse with regards to the relationship between the army and society**. This change is manifested in the legislative efforts around the 'Equal Share of the Burden Law' as well as the public focus on and interest in the defense budget and the compensation granted to IDF pensioners. This discourse enables the opening of a dialogue on the issue of the needed covenant between the army and Israeli society.

32. **Widening the circle of participants in the political-security discourse and activities beyond the Government of Israel** – The circle of discourse and
activities in national security is expanding beyond the Government of Israel to include non-government elements in civil society and within the Jewish world. This expansion takes place in fields such as: security and political assessment; diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, hasbara, and the battle against Israel's delegitimization; international law; home front resilience; relations with the Jewish world; and the security budget and personnel compensation.

As a result of these developments:

33. **The importance of the conventional military threat has significantly decreased** – The scenario in which massive military forces invade Israel has become unlikely in the current context.

34. **The Arab-Israel conflict has been marginalized** after decades in which it was at the center of the agenda and perceived as the main cause of regional instability.

35. **The Palestinian Authority has unprecedented freedom to reach understandings or agreements with Israel**, resulting from the weakening of obstructionist elements in the Arab world.

36. **The bewilderment experienced by Western countries in relation to the region enables Israel to advance an independent agenda** that can also shape their approach.

37. **The ripening of the domestic Israeli arena for structural and institutional changes** can enable integrating excluded populations in national service and in the workforce.

Alongside these developments:

38. **The governance system in Israel possesses the capacity to shape policy, make decisions, and implement them** – The nineteenth Knesset of Israel began its new term in April 2013, and is expected to serve for an additional three years. The prime minister of Israel and his government are also stable. These combined capacities can produce significant and far-reaching change.

**The Vision: Israel as the Middle of the East**

This section of the document lays out the foundations of the vision for Israel’s national security toward its seventy-fifth year that will seize the existing window of opportunity.

The components of the national security vision toward the seventy-fifth year of the state are:
39. A national security concept that is flexible, relevant, and effective, that is continuously updated, and which harnesses diverse elements within the government and in civil society.

40. A regional power –
   - Indisputable superiority, flexibility, and relevance in deploying a range of military and security tools across the Middle East, such that Israel's physical existence and the security of its citizens are assured for many years;
   - A web of connections with governments and civil societies across the Middle East conducted through governmental and non-governmental entities, both openly and covertly.

41. A soft power superpower in the region and the world – The ability to serve the interests of Israel in the region and in the world on the basis of a significant, and distinctly Israeli contribution to humanity, with an impact that is disproportionate to Israel's size, resources, and population, through a global network of relationships comprising Israeli institutions, both governmental and civilian. Israeli interests can be advanced by developing a global presence of actors that can deploy a variety of soft 'tools,' such as diplomacy and branding, in fields such as trade, culture, business, and science and technology.

42. Legitimacy surplus – A significant improvement in Israel's international status and in its fundamental legitimacy as a result of its global indispensability, which renders challenges to its right to exist unthinkable, as a result of:
   - Breaking the basic hostility toward Israel in the Arab and Muslim world by establishing 'bridgeheads' of legitimacy among Arabs and Muslims for Israel's existence and for normalized ties with it;
   - Establishing Israel's cumulative contribution to humanity, in the Middle East and across the world, as a pillar of its legitimacy.

43. A secured Jewish majority in Israel, by means of ending control of the Palestinian population in the framework of a separation arrangement or an arrangement for co-existence within a combined political entity.

44. Israeli society integrated in the Jewish world’s network of communities by means of a web of connections between communities, organizations, and individuals.

45. A new covenant between the IDF and Israeli society regarding security service, such that every citizen has the opportunity for equal and more significant service,
and such that security service contributes to the country's inclusive growth without harming its strength and Israel's security.

46. **A security concept that balances between the tensions contained within the vision** – Relationships between different components of the vision are sometimes complementary and contain ingrown tensions, such as:

- On the spectrum of "internal cohesion," on the one hand the IDF-Israeli society covenant will strengthen the dynamic. On the other hand, ending control of the Palestinians may precipitate a deep societal crisis in the absence of a consensus and resulting from the need to forcefully impose the chosen alternative of withdrawal or disengagement;

- On the spectrum of "source of legitimacy," on the one hand indisputable military and security superiority entail a strong army and willingness to deploy it, for example in exerting control over the Palestinians, which is today a source of international condemnation. On the other hand, a legitimacy surplus implies a wider use of "soft" tools at the expense of "hard power." Either withdrawal or disengagement from the West Bank will enhance legitimacy but may be seen as representing a decline in Israel's strength;

- On the spectrum of "identification," an identity that emphasizes the local and a web of relationships in close geographic proximity stands as a tension before a Western identity with a global presence or a Jewish and global presence.

47. **Effectiveness through broad and comprehensive engagement** – The national security concept will be based on flexibility and relevance. Relevance relates to response principles that enable shaping reality across the variety and complexity that it encompasses. Flexibility refers to the ability to focus efforts and respond to emerging phenomena, and to continually update the overarching concept in accordance with developments on the ground. Flexibility and relevance will enable navigating between the tensions across various contexts.
The Organizing Principles of the Israeli Revolution in National Security Affairs

This section of the document details the proposed organizing principles for changing the national security concept in order to fulfill the national objectives discussed. At their core stands the insight that Israel's national security in the twenty-first century will require harnessing Israeli society broadly, and that the government alone cannot carry the burden.

48. **The background: An erosion in the ability of the government to provide national security by itself** – The variety of national security challenges broaden and the number of actors affecting it rises – within state institutions and outside of them, and within Israel and outside of it. In light of this, the ability of the government to provide a response by means of the tools available to it through the 'closed system' approach is eroding.

49. **The opening of the system will require adaptation** – Advancing the vision for Israel's national security – against the backdrop of the erosion in the current concept and the existing strategic window of opportunity – requires broadening
the operational approach of Israel's national security system on the basis of the following principles:

- **Partnerships and collaboration with civil society**, and mainly with universities, non-profit organizations, research institutes, etc.;
- **Decentralizing the responsibility** towards sub-units within public agencies and enhancing the interconnectivity between them;
- **Culture of 'generalship'** – Cultivation of systemic vantage points and strategic understanding and abilities among individuals at all levels of the system;
- **Constant experimentation and learning** in the field through new and renewing models that will enable the development of effective operational concepts.

**Strategic Efforts for Generating the Required Change**

This section of the document details the different campaigns which, if successfully implemented, will stimulate the crucial revolution in Israel's national security and advance the overall vision.

50. **Upgrading the national security system** in a way that includes the broad range of influences on national security in shaping and updating the overarching concept. This new structure requires:

- **Empowering the role of the National Security Council such that it provides unique value to leadership** – In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War, the role and responsibilities of the National Security Council (NSC) were upgraded so that it could provide adequate support in the decision-making processes of the country's leaders. This upgrade has proven to be insufficient.

In order to fulfill the vision discussed, an additional upgrade is needed in the abilities of the NSC, primarily related to shaping the national security concept, contributing to national security assessments, and designing and implementing strategic initiatives in this field. As such, the NSC must be a significant partner that provides unique value stemming from its comprehensive systemic vantage point and is able to challenge the system's assumptions and generate independent processes.
Changing the national assessment process such that it comprehensively explores the state of national security and serves the process of shaping the national security concept. Today, the national assessment process stems from intelligence estimates focused on threats, and occurs in the absence of global perspectives. Suggested emphases are:

- Assessment of the full range of national security elements and strategic objectives;
- Identification and development of opportunities embedded in regional and global developments;
- Integration of non-governmental elements in preparing the assessment, from the civilian sector, such as think tanks, researchers, retired government officials, and Jewish world organizations;
- Management of learning processes and capacity building in the field of national security.

51. Decentralizing the field of foreign relations beyond the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government offices and their agencies – The foreign relations sector, comprising embassies and diplomatic emissaries, lacks the capacity to meet emerging needs in a changing world. We propose revolutionizing this sector by mobilizing from within civil society and private sector spheres with the purpose of cultivating a robust network of sustained high-quality professional connections with governmental and non-governmental elites. These connections can be focused around humanitarian initiatives, collaboration with civil society organizations, and military, economic, and diplomatic assistance. Central objectives in this field include:

- Harnessing Israel to advance solutions to acute problems facing humanity (Tikkun Olam) – Israel, in partnership with the Jewish world, must reclaim its central role in contending with the key challenges facing humanity in fields related to quality of life at the global 'bottom of the economic pyramid';

- Re-structuring the relationship between the people and leadership of the Jewish world – Doing so requires an infrastructure that promotes collaboration in areas of mutual interest and objectives, such as: humanitarian assistance, combatting Israel's delegitimization and anti-Semitism, and contending with issues of Jewish identity. The Israeli government and civil society, in partnership with the Jewish world, must develop a number of significant initiatives that will affect wide circles of Jews and Israelis;
Developing a platform of relationships in the Middle East through the government and civil society in order to seize the opportunities embedded in the changes in the region and to penetrate the wall of hostility toward Israel.

52. A new covenant between the national security system and Israeli society that combines the national security vision, societal needs, and security needs. This covenant, to be based on the principle of equality, will provide a response to the needs of the army and will contribute to Israeli society. Its foundations are:

- Shaping a model of military and civil service as an engine of inclusive growth. This will require assessing the scope and content of service;
- Decentralizing home front resilience and emergency preparedness to the community level in order to contend with war and natural disasters that will affect a significant proportion of the land and population;
- Launching a new operational concept for the armed forces that is adapted to the budgetary reality, derived from the new covenant, and aligned with the broader national security concept.

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The vision

- A flexible, relevant, and effective security concept
- Legitimacy surplus
- Soft power superpower in the region and world
- Regional power in connections and military force
- Ensured Jewish majority in Israel
- Part of Jewish world network of communities

Principles of action to adapt to the open system:
- Practices of cooperation
- Practices of decentralization
- Culture of ‘generalship’
- Constant field experimentation and learning

Diplomatic responsibility beyond the government

New structure for national security system

New covenant between the army and society

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Call for a New and Continuous 'Ben-Gurion style' Seminar

53. The 'seminars' that Ben Gurion conducted in advance of the founding of the State of Israel and in its first years shaped Israel's national security paradigm. The seminar was an ongoing learning workshop. In its course, Ben Gurion tested the assumptions standing at the basis of the national security concept of the state-in-the-making until 1947 in contrast to the emerging reality, and defined a new vision and strategy. At the time, these changes were difficult for those who made up Israel's national security community to accept.

54. The Revolution in Military Affairs of the 1990s require a reassessment – In the beginning of the '90s an operational revolution took place within Western armies based on technological developments and political-strategic changes such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. This revolution, which was based on a combination of guided weaponry, communications systems, and command and control, was called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). With time, opponents of Western states developed an operational response to the various technologies and concepts found within the RMA which undermined the very superiority of the model.

55. There is a need today for a revolution in the national security affairs (RNSA) of Israel – As stated in this document, the radical changes in Israel's strategic environment challenge the fundamental assumptions of its national security concept, and among them the 'Iron Wall' approach and confidence in technological superiority (RMA) as the central component in Israel's security response. In light of these changes, and moving toward the seventy-fifth year of Israel's existence, there is a need for another revolution in the national security paradigm – a Revolution in National Security Affairs – in the spirit of Ben Gurion's seminar.